On March 5, news outlets reported that the U.S. government is drafting new export control regulations for AI chips. A copy of the draft regulations is not publicly available. According to reports, the draft regulations would cover most high-end processors sold by U.S. companies, positioning the U.S. as a gatekeeper for the global AI industry.
Following its March 11 announcement of a Section 301 investigation focused on structural excess capacity, on March 12 the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) initiated new investigations into 60 of the United States’ largest trading partners, examining whether those countries have failed to impose and effectively enforce bans on the importation of goods produced with forced labor.
On March 11, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced the initiation of a series of Section 301 investigations under the Trade Act of 1974 into “structural excess capacity and production in manufacturing sectors.” The investigations target the following countries: China, the European Union, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan and India. The Administration has identified these as countries that “appear to exhibit structural excess capacity in various manufacturing sectors, such as through large or persistent trade surpluses or underutilized or unused capacity.”
In recent weeks, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has greatly expanded the scope of authorized activities and transactions that U.S. persons may undertake regarding energy projects in Venezuela. The expanded authorizations align with the wider U.S. strategy to relax certain sanctions after President Maduro’s removal on January 3, 2026, signaling a significant shift toward broader commercial engagement with Venezuela’s energy industry.
On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 6–3 decision (in Learning Resources v. Trump) holding that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.
On February 6, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) issued a Request for Information (RFI) seeking public input on CFIUS Known Investor Program (KIP). The RFI signals Treasury’s intent to formalize and begin implementation of the KIP announced in May 2025.
Following the removal of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026, the Trump administration has taken actions to expand Venezuela-related oil trade and investment opportunities, primarily for U.S. companies.
In recent weeks, the Trump administration has taken several actions to implement its policy toward the export of advanced AI commodities to China. These include the Department of Commerce (Commerce) Bureau of Industry’s (BIS) final rule implementing a case-by-case review policy (changed from a presumption of denial policy) of exports of certain advanced computing commodities to end users in China (including Macau), and a Proclamation following an investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232) of imports of semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment and derivative products, which narrowly targets the advanced AI commodities covered by the BIS export control policy action. The Section 232 Proclamation further provides broad tariff exceptions for in-scope commodities used in domestic applications. These twin actions come on the heels of an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301) of China’s acts, policies and practices (APPs) related to targeting of the semiconductor industry for dominance in which the Administration found that the Chinese APPs were actionable under Section 301, but deferred action.
Below we discuss the BIS final rule, the Section 232 action, and potential next steps for both AI export controls and import restrictions on semiconductors.
On December 2, 2025, the Taiwan’s High Prosecutor’s Office announced criminal indictments against a subsidiary of Japanese company Tokyo Electron (TEL) and several associated individuals for alleged theft of advanced Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) process technology. This case marks the first significant corporate indictment under Taiwan’s updated national-security framework, which is based in part on the U.S. Economic Espionage Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 1831 and 1832), and comes as the U.S. continues apace with its criminal enforcement of export control and trade secret statute violations.
On January 17, President Trump posted on social media that the United States would impose a 10% tariff effective February 1 on eight European countries (France, Germany, UK, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) until those countries accept his demand that the Danish Realm sell Greenland to the United States. The social media post indicated that the tariff rate would rise to 25% on June 1, 2026, if no “deal is reached for the Complete and Total Purchase of Greenland.” As of publication of this alert, the Trump administration has yet to publish any Executive Order or other formal announcement, and circumstances on the ground could change rapidly with contemporaneous political discussions over Greenland in Davos.
